Introduction
There appears to be no precise definition for cybercrime or 'computer crime'.
Computer crime has been described as "any violation of criminal law that involves knowledge of computer technology by the perpetrator, investigator or prosecution".
1 Cybercrime (online misdemeanour) has been defined as including any crime carried out primarily by means of a computer on the Internet; for example, hacking into or damaging a computer network, accessing and stealing electronic data without authorisation, and cyberstalking (via e-mail threats of violence or extortion). 2 Thus, on the one hand, a computer may be the 'object' of the crime when there is theft of computer hardware or software, or a computer may be the 'subject' of a crime when it is used as an 'instrument'
to commit traditional crimes such as fraud, theft, extortion, or 'new' types of criminal activity such as denial of service attacks and malware, identity theft, child pornography, copyright infringement, mail or wire-fraud.
3 prosecution of economic crimes, the protection of intellectual property and procedural provisions that assist in the prosecution of computer crimes. Many governments are adopting computer-specific criminal codes that address unauthorised access and manipulation of data. However, countries that regulate political discourse find it difficult to regulate freedom of expression, as what constitutes acceptable speech in one country is unacceptable in another country.
It is irrelevant for the perpetrator and the victim of a crime to meet, as the unlawful actions committed by a perpetrator in one country may have a direct and immediate effect in another country. 8 4 Berg (n 2) 18. 5
The development of the Internet and the advancement of computer technology have also resulted in the creation of new opportunities for those who engage in illegal activity. See Brenner 2001 Murdoch Univ EJL 1. Brenner argues that law enforcement officials (police officials) should be equipped with the necessary legal tools to pursue cybercriminals. To this end, every legal system should take adequate measures to ensure that its criminal and procedural laws can meet the challenges posed by cybercrimes. 6 Berg (n 2) 20. 7
The perpetrator who is physically located in one country can wreak havoc in other countries as the 'love bug' episode illustrates. The 'love bug' virus emanating from the Philippines, launched during May 2000, affected twenty countries and caused $10 billion in damage. As there were no relevant computer offence laws in the Philippines, the creator of the virus escaped punishment due to the lack of appropriate laws with which to charge him (the perpetrator). This virus illustrates the problems that this type of activity poses for law enforcement (the police) in cross-border prosecution, such as the lack of cybercrimespecific criminal laws, the inadequacy of criminal laws, the lack of international agreements, the difficulties with jurisdiction and the difficulty in determining the number and effect of cyber offences. Brenner (n 5) 3. Also see Wilson 2006 Aust LJ 700 and Goodman and Brenner 2002 IJLIT 140-141 , for further discussion about the 'love bug' virus. 8
Eg, the dissemination of Nazi propaganda denying that the Holocaust existed is illegal in Germany, and it is also a crime to display, exchange or sell Nazi paraphernalia in France. However, such material is easily accessible on the World Wide Web. It should be noted
Internet has made cybercrime a trans-border problem with the result that "no island is an island". 15 The 'love bug' virus illustrates that the existence of cybercrime laws is a fundamental prerequisite for investigation as well as prosecution. The Philippine's failure to have cybercrime legislation in place meant that a Philippine national inflicted damage in twenty countries but suffered no consequences for his acts, This failure to have legislation impacted around the globe and illustrated the fragility of our modern networked world. 16 use of alternative strategies such as those that encourage Internet users to share the burden of securing informational privacy. 12 However, Brenner and Clarke advocate that criminal sanctions are preferable to civil liability in addressing cybercrime. They suggest that a system of administrative regulation backed by criminal sanctions will provide incentives to create a workable deterrent to cybercrime. They argue that prohibiting Internet access except through licensed Internet service providers, imposing certification and reporting requirements on larger organisations, requiring transparency regarding the security-related characteristics of information technology products and mandating cyber risk insurance are necessary if society is to control cybercrime. See Brenner and Clarke (n 3) 659-709. 13 See, eg, the Fourth Amendment in the US Constitution, which protects rights and freedoms against unreasonable search and seizure. 14 The 'love bug' virus is an example of this. See inter alia Goodman and Brenner (n 7) 140. 15 See Xingan 2007 Webology 2. 16 Onel de Guzman (a former computer science student) was identified as the person responsible for creating and disseminating the 'love bug' virus. However, Philippine law did not criminalise hacking or the distribution of viruses. The Philippine officials struggled with the question of how to prosecute De Guzman. They finally charged him with theft and credit card fraud but the charges were dismissed. De Guzman could not be extradited for prosecution in other countries such as the US (which has cybercrime laws) because the conduct attributed to De Guzman was not a crime in the Philippines. Extradition treaties require 'double criminality', namely the act for which a person is extradited must be a crime in both the extraditing country and the country seeking the extradition. De Guzman could not be charged for disseminating the 'love bug' virus. This meant that no one was prosecuted for the 'love bug' virus. See Goodman and Brenner (n 7) 142.
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Therefore, the international character of cybercrime calls for international coordination and co-operation to address computer-related offences worldwide.
Law enforcement officials cannot prosecute cyber criminals unless countries have adequate laws in place outlawing such criminal activities.
Cybercrime is said to be becoming easier to carry out as society becomes more dependent on the Internet. This increases the risk of a catastrophic attack.
However, it has been suggested that certain types of cybercrime can create more benefits than costs. 17 Cybercrime differs from other crimes in that it operates within a highly organised system making it more likely to create beneficial effects that outweigh their costs, and the perpetrators usually possess a particular psychology that make them amenable to more innovative law enforcement methods. 18 The millions of computers which are connected to the Internet are vulnerable to the threat of cybercrime. This vulnerability is compounded by the combination of more creative hackers, the prevalence of powerful computers, and the existence of broadband Internet connections.
Untrained and apathetic users have also created an environment which is vulnerable to damaging attacks on the information infrastructure. 19 Traditional law enforcement tools are regarded as ineffective in addressing these crimes.
Therefore, it is suggested that a non-traditional response would be appropriate, such as securing the information infrastructure by working with industry and Internet users and by enlisting hackers to achieve greater security. 20 The assistance of hackers and users is regarded as important in securing the There was widespread agreement in the 1980s that the United Kingdom's existing computer law was outdated.
United Kingdom
47 The UK's ratification of the COECC also led to calls to amend the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (the CMA). The CMA was consequently amended on 1 October 2008 48 to clarify the meaning of "unauthorised access" to a computer. 49 The inclusion of a new provision also makes it an offence to to make, adapt, supply or offer to supply any item of hardware, software or data for use in the commission of an offence under the Act. 50 The maximum penalty for unauthorised access to a computer system has been increased from six months to two years in prison. However, the statement that the terminatory approach has universal support is criticised.
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The UK experience demonstrates that the UK is trying its best to keep cyber criminals at bay: the increase in the penalty for unauthorised access to a computer (from six months to two years) and the criminalisation of denial of service attacks illustrate a tougher stance on cybercrime. Innovative proposals aimed at child sex offenders have been introduced by the Home Office. The advent of the National Hi-Tech Crime Unit is also lauded. This initiative, which brings the police, the private sector and academics together to combat 52 See Fafinski (n 48) 53-66. However, the advent of the initiative called the National Hi-Tech Crime Unit, which brings the police, private sector and academics together to combat cybercrime is lauded. See Brenner and Clarke (n 3) 682. 53 This is designed to stop child sex-offenders using social networking websites. Registered child sex-offenders will now have to provide their e-mail addresses to the police or face five years in prison. The first UK Social Networking Guidance has also been published, which provides advice on how to stay safe online. See Anon The Peninsula 9. 54 [2004] EWCA Crim 631. It should be noted that s 4 and s 5 of the CMA also provide that the UK has jurisdiction to try the offender if the offence is 'significantly linked' to the UK. 55 This is the termination theory which is supported by much case law. The inadequacy of the existing criminal laws to address computer misuse and computer offences has led to calls for distinct statutory laws for computer offences in order to keep up with modern technology. 59 The aim of the Cth is to protect the commercial integrity of systems that process and store information rather than the information itself. The involvement of the private sector will help to improve the ability of law enforcement (the police) to effectively perform its role of combating cybercrime, and will also assist the private sector to address cyber-threats. This will also help to minimise financial damage. 67 In Australia, the role of the financial services industry in targeting cybercrime developed as a result of its being targeted by cybercriminals, and in this regard the Australian Bankers
Association has undertaken a number of projects addressing the problem of rising levels of cybercrime.
68 the expedited collection of evidence stored on computers. However, Australia doesn't have laws to this effect. Therefore it is advocated that the current legislation needs to be amended to reflect these provisions. Ibid. 65 These multinational corporations also have powers to prevent and detect crime that transcends national borders. Bronitt and Gani (n 57) 313, 317. 66 Wilson (n 7) 694. The article considers inter alia, the nature and scale of cybercrime in the private sector and the financial services industry, and the need for effective public and private partnerships to stem the tide of increasing instances of cybercrime, to obtain recovery of lost funds, and to pursue the perpetrators of cybercrime. 67 Id 700-701. 68 The increase in cybercrime has placed an enormous financial burden on the financial services industry, for which its members already absorb much of the costs. Nevertheless, the partnership between the financial service industry and the police is said to be a successful one. It is advocated that a similar partnership should be extended to the private sector to counteract cybercrimes. Id 702.
The extension of jurisdiction extra-territorially in the Cth adheres to the modern legislative trend. This is commendable. Although Australia has not joined the COECC, it is taking positive steps to review its current legislation to bring it in line with the COECC. ICT Law 101. 54/360 in the country. The GCC countries were urged to follow the example of the UAE by enacting comprehensive cyber legislation.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia passed laws governing cybercrime during October 2006.
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There are no specific laws addressing internet crime in Qatar. However, computer-specific criminal statutes should also adapt their rules of evidence to computer crimes to facilitate prosecution of cyber criminals.
Qatar

Position before the inception of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002
Most of the so-called traditional crimes such as murder, rape, theft, malicious injury to property and housebreaking originate from the South African common law, namely Roman-Dutch law. These traditional crimes deal only with tangibles whereas IT crime or cybercrime deals with intangibles. The 81 ICTQATAR had been involved with drafting the telecommunications law, as well as the draft e-commerce law which is expected to be passed in the near future. Ibid. 82 See Anon 2009 www.zawya.com. It should be noted that Trend Micro, an international company specialising in internet content security, is educating regional organisations and individuals about cybercrime. 83 Townson (n 80).
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56/360 perception has thus arisen that the common law cannot effectively deal with IT crime. 84 
Before the commencement of the Electronic Communications and Transactions
Act 25 of 2002 (hereinafter, the ECT), the common law and statutory law applied to online forms of offences such as indecency (child pornography), fraud (cyber fraud) and crimen injuria (cyber-smearing).
The case of S v Mashiyi
However, the common law was ineffective in addressing crimes such as theft, extortion, spamming and phishing.
86 considered the question of admissibility of computergenerated documents. The court held that documents which contain information that has been processed and generated by a computer are not admissible as evidence in a criminal trial. On the other hand, the court found that where documents have been scanned to produce an electronic image of the original, then such an image is regarded as an exact image and is therefore admissible. However, in terms of the "prevailing law" the court could not admit into evidence the disputed documents which contained information that has been processed and generated by a computer. 87 84 To illustrate this, the common-law crime of theft is not adequate for combating IT crime in South Africa. So too the common-law crime of fraud. For further discussion about the inability of the common law to address IT crime, see Anon 2005 Cyber Law 121, par 346-349. Also see Burchell 2002 SALJ 585 , where Professor Burchell states that the common law is not suited to punish conduct such as unauthorised access to computer systems and altering computer data. However, he maintains that conduct committed using a computer as an instrument is generally covered by existing common-law crimes such as theft, fraud, invasion of privacy and murder. 85 Prior to the inception of the ECT, crimes such as the possession and distribution of child pornography could be prosecuted in terms of s 27 (1) 
Cyber inspectors are
93 Also see Hofman (n 92) 262, where it is stated that the ordinary South African law on the admissibility of evidence will apply to data messages except where the ECT changes it. See inter alia, SB Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife (Case D204/07) where an e-mail which was used to accept an employment contract was regarded as conclusive proof that the said employment had been accepted. Also see S v Motata (Case number 63/968/07) where electronic information, that is data in the form of images and sound from a cell phone, was admitted into evidence at the conclusion of a trial within a trial. In this case, Judge Motata allegedly drove into a wall of a private home whilst being under the influence of liquor. The owner of the home made an audio recording of the accident on his cellphone. The judge had challenged the admissibility of five cellphone recordings in his trial for driving under the influence. The recording was copied onto a computer and the issue arose whether this constituted real or documentary evidence. The judge was found guilty of drunken driving by the Johannesburg magistrate's court on 2 September 2009. However, he was acquitted of the other charges of obstructing the ends of justice and an alternative charge for resisting arrest. The judge was sentenced to a R20 000 fine or 12 months' imprisonment for drunken driving in the Johannesburg magistrate's court on 9 September 2009. His defence has indicated that the judge will apply for leave to appeal 99 It is submitted that s 90 is more comprehensive than a 22 of the COECC. Art 22 provides that a country has jurisdiction when an offence is committed in: (a) its territory; (b) on board a ship flying a flag of that party; (c) on board an aircraft registered in that country; (d) by one of its nationals if the offence is punishable under criminal law where it was committed or if the offence was committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of any state. The application of s 90 is, however, limited to crimes that can be committed under the ECT. 100 S 90(c) is regarded as being "too broad". It appears that where no country has jurisdiction in respect of the offence, then the nationality of the perpetrator should play an important role in deciding where he should be prosecuted. This conforms with art 22 of the COECC. 101 S 90(d) is also said to be problematic, because it differs from s 28(1)(d) of the Magistrate's Courts Act 32 of 1944, which requires the "whole cause of action" to take place within a particular court or district (territorial borders), whilst s 90(d) provides for jurisdiction in terms of nationality rather than because the offence was committed within its territorial borders. It is also problematic if the cybercrime is committed beyond our borders but the offender is prosecuted in South Africa. Then the question arises as to which regional court 61/360
Recent case law addressing cybercrime
In Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services, 102 the court had to consider inter alia whether a computer print-out which was a copy, complied with the best evidence rule or could not be admitted into evidence unless properly proved.
The court found that firstly, the plaintiff's failure to object to the evidence during the trial precluded him from relying on the best evidence rule only during argument. The plaintiff had also referred extensively to the print-out during evidence without objecting, with the result that it amounted to a tacit waiver of the best evidence principle. Secondly, the court found that as the print-out was generated by a computer, it was governed by the ECT. Thus, it examined section 15 of the ECT and found that section 15(1)(a) prohibits the exclusion from evidence of a data message on the mere grounds that it was generated by a computer and not by a natural person, and section 15(1)(b) on the mere grounds that it is not in its original form. However, the court found that the print- apply. 105 The court found that because certain individuals had signed exhibits D1 to D4, the computer had been used as a tool to create the relevant documentation. Therefore, these documents constituted hearsay. Exhibits D5 to D9 had been created without human intervention and such evidence constituted real evidence. Therefore, the admissibility of this evidence depended on the reliability and accuracy of the computer and its operating systems and processes. The duty to prove such accuracy and reliability lay with the state. 106 However, exhibits D1-D9 were found to have complied with section 221 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, and they were therefore provisionally admitted into evidence.
107 documents in question were admissible in terms of the existing law, it was unnecessary to make a finding on the retrospective application of the ECT. 105 It should be noted that s 3 gives the court a discretion to admit hearsay evidence if it is in the interests of justice. 106 S 34 requires documents to be made by a person (in terms of Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965). It was clear from the evidence that the computer was used as a tool with respect to exhibits D1 to D4. Although printed on a computer, the exhibits were signed by a functionary as envisaged by s 34(4). Therefore, this was 'made' by a functionary as envisaged by s 34(1). The court held that exhibits D5-D9 did not comply with the requirements of s 34 as these exhibits were not 'made' by a functionary. 107 It should be noted that s 221 deals with the admissibility of certain trade or business records provided that certain conditions are met. The court found that the print-outs were documents and they fell within the category of a record relating to a trade or business. The statements the state sought to introduce in exhibits D1-D4 had been obtained from persons who had personal knowledge of their contents, whilst the information in these statements had been sorted out and collated by a computer to produce exhibits D5-D9.
The court's progressive approach in 63/360 regarding part of the computer-based evidence as real evidence has been lauded.
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South African banks are also vulnerable to cybercrime.
The above discussion demonstrates that our courts are adopting a cautious approach in cybercrime cases. Although the Ndiki decision is encouraging, it is submitted that more clear and concise judicial guidance on the admissibility and evidential weight of electronic evidence is needed in future cases. It is submitted that the private sector has a vested interest in addressing bank-related crime.
The South African banking sector
Way forward
114 The South African Law Reform
Commission (SALRC) has also recommended the introduction of legislation on the protection of personal information (so-called "information protection legislation or information privacy legislation").
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It is submitted that South Africa can learn from the approaches followed in other countries. We can take note of the UK model (as in the CMA) by introducing stricter penalties in the ECT. We need to prescribe harsher penalties to deter cyber criminals. We can also examine the feasibility of introducing collaborative initiatives involving the police, the private sector and academics to combat Tribunal similar to that in India will also ensure that cyber cases are given priority. It will also lessen the case load on our already over-burdened courts.
Indeed, our police and judiciary should also become more cybercrime savvy, like their Indian counterparts. Last but not least, we should follow the US in ratifying the COECC, as the treaty offers a global approach to the global problem of cybercrime.
Africa perspective
African countries have been criticised for dealing inadequately with cybercrime as their law enforcement agencies are inadequately equipped in terms of personnel, intelligence and infrastructure, and the private sector is also lagging behind in curbing cybercrime. African countries are pre-occupied with attending to pressing issues such as poverty, the Aids crisis, the fuel crisis, political The following reasons illustrate the difficulty in addressing cybercrime: the lack of tools for the use of police to tackle the problem; the fact that the 'old' laws do not fit the 'new' crimes being committed; the fact that the new laws have not adjusted to the reality on the ground; that there are few precedents to be used for guidance; that there are debates over privacy issues which hamper the ability of enforcement agents to gather evidence needed to prosecute new cases; and that the distrust between police and computer professionals hampers close co-operation between the two parties to effectively address the cybercrime problem and make the Internet a safe place. See Singh (n 72) 1. 120 See Bazelon et al (n 1) 306. 121 The case of Rami Yousef who orchestrated the 1993 World Trade Center bombing by using encryption to store details of his scheme on his laptop computer is a case in point.
Ibid.
Although technology advancement is welcomed, it has created numerous challenges. There is a need for security-related features on the internet to respond to these challenges. Countries should strive to strike a balance between protecting the safety and security of individuals and guaranteeing the free dissemination of information and opinion.
The unanimous participation of all nations is required in order to achieve meaningful prosecution.
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122 Regarding the practical impediments to international investigation and enforcement, see Miquelan-Weissmann (n 3) 335-336. 123 Interpol is co-operating with credit card companies to combat payment fraud by building a database on Interpol's web site. Interpol is also making efforts to establish a network for collating information relating to illegal activities on the Internet. Regional efforts have also been made to combat cybercrime by bodies such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Council of Europe (the COE), the European Union and the Organisation of American States (the OAS). However, these regional efforts are limited to specific states. See Xingan (n 15) 3-4. 124 International organisations examine the promotion of security awareness at both the international and national levels, the harmonisation of national legislation, coordination and co-operation in law enforcement and they direct anti-cybercrime actions. 125 International co-operation is required to punish cybercrime offenders. Thus, international co-operation is limited to the particular participants and treaty signatories who have enacted domestic cybercrime legislation. 126 The efforts by the UK Home Office to censure sex offencers on the Internet are lauded.
See Anon (n 53) 9.
H Jahankhani calls for a global digital community to take steps to evaluate and safeguard cyber legislation to achieve efficient and socially responsible use of the Internet, because the 68/360 global community is responsible for evaluating such legislation. 127 An effective fight against cybercrime requires increased, rapid and efficient international cooperation in criminal matters. Regarding the problem with jurisdiction, Brenner suggests that a country should expand the "territorial notion" of jurisdiction to prosecute so that it allows a country to prosecute regardless of whether the offender's conduct occurred in whole or in part in the prosecuting country's territory. 128 Brenner also suggests that countries should evaluate their procedural law governing collection and analysis of evidence to include 
